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LENDER LIABILITY AND THE CORPORATE VEIL: 
AN ANALYSIS OF LENDERS AS SHAREHOLDERS 
UNDER CERCLA 
Lawrence J. Sheh * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed the Asset Con-
servation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act 
(ALDA).l Prior to the passage of ALDA, lenders who had security 
interests in property operated as a hazardous waste site were trapped 
in a Catch-22.2 Case law suggested that if the lender merely partici-
pated in the management of the company running the site, it faced 
potential liability as a waste site operator under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA).3 However, if the lender did nothing, but was later forced to 
foreclose on the property, thus gaining full title to the waste site, it 
also faced potential liability as an owner under CERCLA.4 ALDA 
limits a lender's liability for costs associated with environmental 
cleanup, holding lenders responsible for cleaning up property only if 
they are involved in the management of the business which operates 
the premises.5 The passage of ALDA resolves the inconsistency be-
tween lender liability and shareholder/owner liability under CER-
CLA, and provides a more predictable course for future case law.6 
* Production Editor, Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW 
REVIEW, 1997-1998. 
1 Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996 
(ALDA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
2 See infra Part VI. 
3 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
4 See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Pa. 1989); 
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986); United States 
v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994, 20,997 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
5 See ALDA § 2502(b). 
6 See infra Part VI. 
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This comment analyzes lenders as stakeholders in a corporation, 
and different from a shareholder only in that a lender's interest is tied 
to a specific piece of corporate property, whereas a shareholder has a 
general interest in all matters of the corporation.7 Furthermore, since 
shareholders and lenders both contribute greatly to the capitalization 
of the company, both should incur similar risks if the company is sued 
or is unprofitable. This comment will show that imposing lender liabil-
ity under an "owner" theory of liability is similar to piercing the 
corporate veil, and is precisely what courts have attempted to avoid 
with respect to corporate parents and shareholders.8 
Part II of this Comment will discuss CERCLA and provide some 
basic background material on its origins and purpose. Part III will 
address some aspects of corporate law which provide important back-
ground to the cases that will be discussed. Part IV will move on to 
the liability of corporations, both in the context of parent/subsidiary 
liability and shareholder liability under CERCLA. Part V will deal 
with the liability of lenders before the passage of ALDA. Lastly, Part 
VI will discuss the inconsistencies between pre-ALDA lender liability 
and judicial interpretations of corporate parent and shareholder liabil-
ity, and how ALDA reconciles these differences. 
II. THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, 
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT 
CERCLA was passed in December, 1980 "[t]o provide for liability, 
compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous sub-
stances released into the environment and the cleanup of inactive 
hazardous waste disposal sites."9 By passing CERCLA, Congress 
attempted to achieve two goals: first, CERCLA would allow the 
government to promptly and effectively respond to problems of haz-
ardous wastes and their disposal, and second, the costs of cleanup 
would be imposed on those responsible for the contamination.10 To 
accomplish these goals, Congress created the Hazardous Substances 
7 See 19 William Meade Fletcher et aI., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS §§ 3:42, 3:43 (penn. ed. rev. vol. 1990) [hereinafter FLETCHER CyC CORP]. 
8 See infra Part VI. 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 68 F.3d 811, 821 n.19 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. A & 
F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984); see also Brent Nicholson & Todd 
Zuiderhoek, The Lender Liability Dilemma: Fleet Factors History and Aftermath, 38 S.D. L. 
REV. 22, 24 (1993). 
10 See Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,45 Bus. LAW. 923, 
925 (1990). 
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Response Trust Fund, more commonly known as the "Superfund," to 
finance the costs of cleaning sites by levying excise taxes on the 
chemical and petroleum industries.l1 Understanding that the problem 
of hazardous wastes is not insular, CERCLA does not hold just these 
industries liable for waste cleanup,12 In 1986, the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) increased the initial Super-
fund balance of $1.6 billion to $8.5 billion to allow for a more agressive 
attack on hazardous waste sites.13 
Four groups of contributors to a hazardous waste site can be held 
liable under CERCLA.14 They are 1) owners of waste sites; 2) opera-
tors of waste sites; 3) arrangers of hazardous materials; and 4) trans-
porters of hazardous materials.15 When the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) targets a potential hazardous waste site, the owners 
and operators become known as potentially responsible parties, or 
PRPS.16 CERCLA then enables EPA to do one of three things: 1) 
order the responsible party to remediate the site, and impose fines of 
up to $25,000 per day of non-compliance; 2) seek an injunction to 
compel a responsible party to clean up the site; or 3) clean up the 
waste itself using Superfund money, and then seek recompense from 
a responsible party.17 Once cleanup by the government begins with 
money from the Superfund, a PRP may not seek any court relief until 
all the work has been completed.18 Further, when the PRP does get 
to court, it is not entitled to a jury trial and is allowed to present very 
11 See Roger J. Marzulla and Brett G. Kappel, Lender Liability Under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 41 S.C. L. REV. 705, 708 (1990); 
Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 26. 
12 CERCLA defines a person to be "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, 
consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, 
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U .S.C. § 9601(21) (1994). 
13 See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 26. 
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). 
15 See id. 
16 There are four general categories of potentially responsible parties: 1) the owner and 
operator of a vessel or facility; 2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substanes were disposed of; 
3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, ... 
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person ... at any facility ... owned or 
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances; and, 4) any 
person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment 
facilties, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or 
a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance. 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1)-(4). 
17 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606, 9607(a) (1994); see also Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, 
at 26. 
18 See Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 11, at 707. 
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little, if any, of its own evidence.19 In deciding the case, the court is 
limited to the administrative record prepared by the government, 
"whose judgments are entitled to deference by the court unless they 
are found to be arbitrary and capricious."2o A PRP can be held both 
strictly liable for its disposal of the waste, and jointly and severally 
liable for the costs of the cleanup, regardless of the extent of its 
contribution of wastes.21 
CERCLA provides three defenses for PRPs that enable them to 
escape liability.22 A PRP will not be held liable if it can prove that the 
damage was caused by: 
1) an act of God; 
2) an act of war; 
3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or 
agent of the defendant, or one whose act or omission occurs in 
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or 
indirectly with the defendant, ... if the defendant establishes ... 
that 
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous sub-
stance[s] [and] ... 
(b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of 
any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably 
result from such acts or omissions.23 
Although the first two defenses have been practically non-existent in 
subsequent litigation, the third exception permits the PRP to escape 
liability if it proves the two elements by a preponderance of the 
evidence.24 In the earlier years of CERCLA litigation, PRPs exerted 
much effort trying to create new defenses, exemptions, limitations, 
and procedural and jurisdictional hurdles to avoid liability.25 These 
attempts were largely unsuccessfu1.26 
CERCLA, however, does provide an exemption for secured credi-
tors.27 Specifically, the statute states that an "owner or operator" does 
not include persons who do not participate in the management of a 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 27. 
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994). 
23 [d. 
24 See Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 11, at 710. What has become known as the "innocent 
landowner" defense added a third element to the other two, and requires that the landowner 
"purchased the property without knowing or having reason to know that the property was 
contaminated by hazardous substances." See id. 
25 See Barr, supra note 10, at 924. 
26 See id. 
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994). 
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facility but do hold an "indicia of ownership" in order to protect a 
security interest.28 Because CERCLA was not intended to target 
lenders, but instead "hazardous waste generators and transporters," 
it was unclear whether Congress intended an "owner" to include a 
lender who foreclosed on property and took title.29 It was also unclear 
whether a lender was deemed an "operator" when it enforced certain 
terms of the loan.30 As will be discussed below in Part V, courts have 
struggled with CERCLA's provisions because of the vague language 
of the statute and the relative lack of legislative history.31 Congress 
made clear its goals for the statute, but intended that the courts fill 
the gaps with the development of an evolving federal common law.32 
In doing so, Congress sought to create uniformity in CERCLA liabil-
ity in the national goal of environmental protection.33 However, courts 
have had problems with consistency in establishing liability when 
applying the "owner" and "operator" theories of liability.34 
III. THE CORPORATION 
A. The Corporation and Limited Liability 
A corporation is a legal "person" created by a group of incorpora-
tors, generally to facilitate dealings in business transactions that 
would be much more complicated to achieve otherwise.35 The classical 
theory of the corporation included two basic truths: first, that a cor-
poration was merely one way of creating a business entity, and second, 
that the corporation was the best way to amass a large amount of 
capital from numerous investors.36 These individual investors then 
became known as shareholders, and held an ownership interest in the 
company.37 In addition to shareholders, another common source of 
capital to finance asset requirements comes from financial institutions 
such as banks.38 Banks provide funds to businesses on both short and 
28 See id. 
29 See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 28. 
30 See id. 
3! See Barr, supra note 10, at 923. 
32 See id. at 925. 
33 See id. at 925-26. 
34 See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 28. 
35 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937,42-44 (1991). 
36 See id. at 13. 
37 See JAMES C. DOCKERAY & WILLIAM H. HUSBAND, MODERN CORPORATION FINANCE 
225-27 (3d ed. 1952); see also In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 318 (7th Cir. 1996). 
38 See 19 FLETCHER CYC CORP §§ 3:40, 3:41. 
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long-term loans which may be secured or unsecured by company 
property.39 
The characteristics of today's corporations and their legal relation-
ships with the state developed from these two basic truths described 
above.40 One such trait, and arguably the most important, is limited 
liability.41 Limited liability ensures that corporate officers, directors, 
and the shareholder/owners are shielded from liability for tortious 
or illegal corporate actions to the extent of their investment in the 
company.42 In the modern day, courts understand that limited liability 
is one of the principal objectives of incorporation, and are willing to 
respect that purpose so long as the corporation was formed and 
operated consistent with legitimate business purposes.43 
B. Piercing the Corporate Veil 
The mere fact that a business entity has been incorporated (thus 
providing limited liability protection) does not completely preclude 
the courts from holding the individual directors, officers, or sharehold-
ers personally liable in all cases.44 Courts typically "pierce the corpo-
rate veil"45 when the officers and directors have not followed the 
proper formalities of operating a corporation.46 In other words, indi-
vidual officers, directors, or shareholders may be found personally 
liable if two conditions are apparent: 1) the separate personalities of 
the corporation and the shareholders/owners are unified; and 2) to 
respect the corporate form and limit the liability of shareholders and 
owners would sanction a fraud or promote an injustice.47 
89 See id. § 3:41. 
40 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 13-14. 
41 See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 73 (3d ed.1983). 
Other important attributes would include (1) the power to contract and to take, hold, and convey 
property in the corporate name; (2) the power to sue and to be sued in the corporate name; (3) 
centralization of management in the board of directors; (4) ready transferability of shares; and 
(5) perpetual succession. See id. § 79. 
42 See id. § 73. 
43 See id. § 146. 
44 See id. 
46 When a court "pierces the corporate veil," the directors, officers, and/or shareholders no 
longer have the protection oflimited liability. Each and every person can then be held personally 
liable for the torts of the company. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 41, § 146. 
46 See id. 
47 See Van Dom Co. v. Future Chern. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1985); see also 
1 FLETCHER CYe CORP § 41.10. 
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The first element in justifying a piercing of the corporate veil can 
be satisfied by a balancing of four factors: 1) failure to maintain 
adequate corporate formalities; 2) the commingling of funds between 
the shareholders and the corporation; 3) undercapitalization of the 
corporation; 4) and a corporation treating the assets of another as its 
own.48 An inquiry into the existence of these four elements is based 
on the rationale that if officers and directors are not performing the 
tasks essential to the proper functioning of a corporation, then those 
running such a company should not get the benefit of limited liability.49 
The second element of the test is satisfied if respecting the corpo-
rate form by not piercing the veil would sanction a fraud or promote 
an injustice.50 In demonstrating that to respect the corporate form 
would sanction a fraud, the plaintiff must show that there was "inten-
tional wrongdoing" by those running the corporation,51 In the alter-
native, a plaintiff can prove that a failure to pierce the corporate veil 
would promote an injustice, a lesser standard than proving fraud 
because intent is not an element.52 This can be accomplished by dem-
onstrating the existence of a compelling public interest53 such that the 
court must disregard the corporate form.54 
For example, in Sea-Land Services v. Pepper Source, the plaintiff 
brought an action against Pepper Source to pierce its corporate veil 
and hold the owner, Gerald J. Marchese, personally liable for debts 
owed to Sea-Land. 55 The plaintiff also sought to "reverse-
pierce" Marchese's other corporations and hold them liable for the 
48 See Van Darn, 753 F.2d at 570; see generally HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 41, § 146. 
49 See Van Darn, 753 F.2d at 569-70; see also Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., Inc., 
283 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Minn. 1979); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1991). 
50 See Van Dorn, 753 F.2d at 570; see also Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 
519, 520--21 (7th Cir. 1991). 
51 See Torco Oil Co. v. Innovative Thermal Co., 763 F. Supp. 1445, 1451 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (citing 
Van Darn, 753 F.2d at 570). 
52 See Van Darn, 753 F.2d at 569-70; see also Sea-Land, 941 F.2d at 522-24. 
53 A compelling public interest may include "any wrong beyond a creditor's inability to collect," 
or for example: 
the common sense rules of adverse possession would be undermined; former partners 
would be permitted to skirt the legal rules concerning monetary obligations; a party 
would be unjustly enriched; a parent corporation that caused a sub's liabilities and its 
inability to pay for them would escape those liabilities; or an intentional scheme to 
squirrel assets into a liability-free corporation while heaping liabilities upon an asset-
free corporation would be successful. 
Sea-Land, 941 F.2d at 524. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 520. 
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debts owed as well.56 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit relied on a test it previously established in Van Dorn 
v. Future Chemical and Oil,57 which set forth the two requirements 
needed to justify piercing the corporate veil, as described above.58 
Finding that Marchese ran all four of his corporations "out of the 
same, single office, with the same phone line, the same expense ac-
counts" and often "used the bank accounts of these corporations to 
pay all kinds of personal expenses, including alimony and child sup-
port payments to his ex-wife, education expenses for his children, 
maintenance of his personal automobiles, [and] health care for his 
pet," the court held that the shared control/unity of interest and 
ownership element of the Van Dorn test was satisfied.59 The court 
noted that Marchese had clearly created these four "shell" corpora-
tions for his own personal use while enjoying the freedom from liabil-
ity provided by their existence.6o 
On remand, the Seventh Circuit held that further evidence submit-
ted by Sea-Land Services clearly proved that failure to pierce the 
corporate veil of Pepper Source would both sanction a fraud and pro-
mote an injustice.61 The court relied on clear evidence that Marchese 
had engaged in tax fraud by treating his personal expenses as deduct-
ible corporate business expenses.62 Thus, the court found that "since 
Marchese was enriched unjustly by his intentional manipulation and 
diversion of funds from his corporate entities, to allow him to use 
these same entities to avoid liability 'would be to sanction an injus-
tice."'63 
Therefore, the incorporation of a business does not guarantee im-
munity from personal liability for the torts of the company.64 Courts 
are generally unwilling to pierce the corporate veil, especially when 
the corporation is managed and operated properly.65 However, when 
5<lld. 
57 Van Dorn, 753 F.2d at 569-70 (citing Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1981» (other citations omitted). 
58 See Sea-Land, 941 F.2d at 520 (citing Van Darn, 753 F.2d 569-70). 
591d. at 521-22. 
6°ld. at 520-21. 
61 See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309, 1313 (7th Cir. 1993). 
62 See id. at 1312. 
63 See id. (citing Gromer, Wittenstrom & Meyer, P.C. v. Strom, 489 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1986». 
64 See, e.g., Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1991); Victoria Elevator Co. 
v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979). 
65 See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 41, § 146. 
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it is clear that the corporation was created merely to avoid personal 
liability or to perpetrate a fraud, courts will not hesitate to hold the 
responsible individuals personally liable.66 
IV. THE LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS UNDER CERCLA 
A. Parent Company Liability Under CERCLA 
The language of CERCLA expressly includes, among other "per-
sons," corporations and other commercial entities as potentially re-
sponsible parties for liability.67 A number of cases have even held that 
a corporation which may be "dead," but whose assets have not yet 
been divided and distributed to shareholders can still be held liable 
under CERCLA.68 Unsurprisingly, resulting lawsuits against corpo-
rations have inquired as to the possibility of piercing the corporate 
veil in order to find liability on the part of the corporation's owners, 
shareholders, or parent company.69 The U.S. government has urged 
the adoption of a uniform federal rule on parent corporation liability.70 
The suggested rule differs substantially from the federal common law, 
and would hold a parent corporation liable either if the parent directly 
participated in the management of the subsidiary, or if the subsidiary 
were substantially integrated in some way into the business of the 
parent.71 In virtually all cases, courts have not found parent corpora-
tions liable for the contamination caused by their subsidiaries merely 
because of their ownership of the stock.72 However, in those cases 
where the parent corporations were held liable, the court found the 
66 See Sea-Land, 993 F.2d at 1313. 
67 42 U.S.C § 9601(21) (1994). 
68 See Chatham Steel Corp. v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 1130, 1152 (N.D. Fl. 1994); United States 
v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1498 (D. Utah 1987). 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. 
Supp. 1193, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 224 (D. 
La. 1988), aff'd, 893 F.2d. 80 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 675 
F. Supp. 22, 30 (D. Mass. 1987). 
70 See Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 11, at 719. 
71Id. 
72 Ownership of stock has not been equated with the notion of "ownership" when determining 
"owner" liability under CERCLA. See, e.g., Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 82-83; In re Acushnet River, 675 
F. Supp. at 32. 
73 See Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27 (holding parent liable for its activities as an operator); 
Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1205 (denying motion to dismiss and holding that "case law suggests 
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parent to be actively involved in the subsidiary's violation, and thus 
directly liable under CERCLA using an "operator" theory of liabil-
ity.73 
Therefore, two theories of parent corporation liability were cre-
ated.74 The first is where the parent corporation can only be held liable 
if the facts support a piercing of the corporate veip5 The second 
theory states that the parent can be held directly liable if it exercises 
control over the subsidiary beyond a certain threshold.76 However, an 
examination of the cases will demonstrate that the two theories are 
essentially different paths to the same result. 
B. Degree of Control Necessary to Pierce the Corporate Veil 
The standard of veil piercing applied by courts under CERCLA is 
the same as the Van Dorn two pronged test, namely that the govern-
ment must show that: 1) there is such unity of interest and ownership 
that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual 
no longer exist; and 2) to respect the corporate form would be to 
sanction a fraud or promote an injustice.77 CERCLA case law has 
established a number of facts which may satisfy the first element of 
unity of interest.78 The "laundry list" that courts have used in deter-
mining whether to pierce the corporate veil consists of the following 
elements (in descending order of importance): 
1) inadequate capitalization in light of the purposes for which the 
corporation was organized; 
2) extensive or pervasive control by the shareholder or sharehold-
ers; 
3) intenningling of the corporation's properties or accounts with 
those of its owner; 
4) failure to observe corporate formalities and separateness; 
5) siphoning of funds from the corporation; 
6) absence of corporate records; or 
7) nonfunctioning officers or directors.79 
that a mortgagee can be held liable under CERCLA only if the mortgagee participated in the 
managerial and operational aspects of the facility in question"). 
74 See Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional 
Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 259, 301 (1992). 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83; In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 33. 
78 See id. (citations omitted). 
79 See id. 
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The degree of control in the second of the seven considerations was 
further broken down into twelve important factors by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jon- T 
Chemicals,BO Each of these elements is very fact specific and the 
ultimate decision to pierce requires a totality test.8! 
The creation of the balancing test began when the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts in In re Acushnet 
River and New Bedford Harbor dealt with the issue of whether the 
court should pierce the corporate veil of Aerovox, Inc., a subsidiary 
wholly owned by RTE Corporation (RTE).82 Aerovox was one of six 
defendants charged with contamination of the New Bedford Harbor 
and the Acushnet River.&'l The court explicitly rejected the govern-
ment's argument that 100 percent ownership of the subsidiary should 
in and of itself be enough to hold the parent corporation liable for the 
violations of its subsidiary.84 Believing it was the duty of Congress and 
not the courts to establish the boundaries of CERCLA liability, the 
court stated that it would not disregard the corporate form and im-
pose liability on the parent "under the guise of furthering some un-
spoken congressional intent," especially when it was not clear that the 
parent did anything illegal. 85 
In United States v. Nicolet, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania also rejected the contention that 
mere ownership of stock in the subsidiary should subject the parent 
corporation to liability.86 Instead, the court followed the theory of 
"operator" liability adopted by the Acushnet court, which requires 
some degree of parent involvement in the management and opera-
tions of the subsidiary in order to hold the parent liable.87 The court 
80 See United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations 
omitted). The test is a balancing of whether: 1) the parent and the subsidiary have common 
stock ownership; 2) the parent and the subsidiary have common directors or officers; 3) the 
parent and the subsidiary have common business departments; 4) the parent and the subsidiary 
file consolidated financial statements and tax returns; 5) the parent finances the subsidiary; 6) 
the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; 7) the subsidiary operates with grossly 
inadequate capital; 8) the parent pays the salaries and other expenses of the subsidiary; 9) the 
subsidiary receives no business except that given to it by the parent; 10) the parent uses the 
subsidiary's property as its own; 11) the daily operations of the two corporations are not kept 
separate; and 12) the subsidiary does not observe the basic corporate formalities, such as 
keeping separate books and records and holding shareholder and board meetings. See id. 
8! See id. at 694. 
82 See In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 30. 
83 See id. at 25. 
84 See id. at 34. 
85 See id. at 32. 
86 See United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
87 See id. 
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further explained the rule for when the corporate veil should be 
pierced in a CERCLA case, stating: 
where a subsidiary is or was at the relevant time a member of one 
of the classes of persons potentially liable under CERCLA; and 
the parent had a substantial financial or ownership interest in the 
subsidiary; and the parent corporation controls or at the relevant 
time controlled the management and operations of the subsidiary, 
the parent's separate corporate existence may be disregarded.88 
The first appellate court to address the issue of parent corporation 
liability was the United Staets Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit.89 In Joslyn ManUfacturing v. T.L. James & Co., the Fifth Cicuit 
rejected the analysis of other cases that held officers liable for the 
costs of cleanup without first piercing the corporate veil. 90 Following 
the lead of In re Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor, the Joslyn 
court refused to pierce the corporate veil, holding that CERCLA does 
not include parent corporations in the definition of owner or opera-
tor.91 The court reasoned that if Congress had intended to extend 
liability to parent corporations, the legislative history would have so 
indicated.92 
Instead, the court used a narrow standard of veil piercing, holding 
that "[v leil piercing should be limited to situations in which the cor-
porate entity is used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud or avoid personal 
liability."93 This holding was a reversion to the traditional doctrine of 
veil piercing, in which courts disregard the corporate form only when 
the facts clearly support the conclusion that the subsidiary is a ''bogus 
shell" of the parent corporation.94 
C. Direct Statutory Liability of Parent Corporations 
The majority of courts96 in other circuits have rejected the Joslyn 
approach, imposing direct statutory liability on a parent corporation 
when the parent has exercised a certain degree of control over the 
SSld. 
89 See generally Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990). 
90 See id. at 82. 
9) See id. at 8:h'l3. 
92 See id. at 83. 
93 See id. 
94 See Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 84. 
96 See generally Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. TIC Inv. 
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subsidiary. This approach can be classified as "operator" liability.96 
Although that amount of control has been a very vague threshold, 
these courts have still been relatively unwilling to apply the tradi-
tional standards of piercing the corporate veil to find liability.97 
For example, in United States v. Kayser-Roth, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit distinguished Joslyn on the 
basis that the issue framed in that case was simply to "impose di-
rect liability on parent corporations for the violations of their wholly 
owned subsidiaries."98 The First Circuit stated that in this case, the 
question was whether Kayser-Roth was to be held directly liable for 
its activities as an operator, versus liability as an owner for the activi-
ties of its subsidiary, Stamina Mills.99 Although the evidence demon-
strated Kayser-Roth's active involvement in the activities of its sub-
sidiary, and that this involvement was clearly sufficient to have 
pierced the corporate veil even under the narrow Joslyn test, the 
First Circuit explicitly declined to use this method of establishing 
liability.1OO Instead, the First Circuit held that Kayser-Roth's perva-
sive control over the activities of Stamina Mills was sufficient in and 
of itself to hold Kayser-Roth directly liable as an operator under 
CERCLA.101 
In Shiavone v. Pearce, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit specifically rejected the Joslyn court's unwillingness 
to perceive CERCLA as "authorizing a departure from longstanding 
principles of corporate law."102 Instead, the Schiavone court reasoned 
that the ability to hold a parent company liable stems from the par-
ent's control over the subsidiary, which in turn necessarily must fall 
Corp., 68 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1995); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 
417 (7th Cir. 1994); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 
1993); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 
910 F.2d 24 (lst Cir. 1990). 
96 See generally Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 248; TIC Inv. Carp., 68 F.3d at 1082; Sidney S. Arst, 25 
F.3d at 417; Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1209; Jacksonville Elec., 996 F.2d at 1107; Carolina 
Transformer, 978 F.2d at 832; Kayser-Roth Carp., 910 F.2d at 24. 
97 See Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 255; United States v. Cordova Chern. Co., 59 F.3d 584, 594--96 (6th 
Cir.) (Ryan, J., dissenting), vacated 67 F.3d 586 (1995). 
98 See Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27 (quoting Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 81). 
99 See id. 
100 See id. at 27-28. 
101 See id. 
102 See Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 255. 
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under an "operator" theory of liability.l03 The court further reasoned 
that "unlike owner liability, the basis for such operator liability is 
wholly independent of any liability on the part of" the subsidiary.l04 
Thus, when evidence establishes that the parent corporation can be 
deemed an operator of the subsidiary (at which point, the Fifth Cir-
cuit would apparently look to piercing the corporate veil), the Second 
Circuit court instead looks to holding the parent directly liable under 
an "operator" theory of liability.106 In adopting this approach, the 
Second Circuit has aligned itself with the majority of circuits in de-
ciding this issue.106 
D. Shareholder Liability Under CERCLA 
Although the requirements for piercing the corporate veil to im-
pose liability on the shareholders of a corporation are the same as they 
are for a parent company, the analysis differs slightly when dealing 
with shareholders. Case law shows that different results occur when 
the shareholder is 1) a corporate officer (but not a director); 2) a simple 
shareholder in a large public corporation; and 3) a shareholder in a 
closely held company.107 Relatively few courts have pierced the corpo-
rate veil to hold a shareholder liable under CERCLA.108 Even those 
courts that have held a shareholder liable, did so only when the 
shareholders involved were also corporate officers who directly con-
trolled the facility.l09 This is the same standard of liability applied in 
determining corporate parent liability. 
For example, in United States v. Mottolo, the defendant was the 
sole shareholder of the corporation.Ho The United States District 
Court for the District of New Hampshire stated that this fact alone 
may have been sufficient to hold him liable, even given the fact that 
lOll See id. at 254-55. 
1M [d. Remember, a court would not be able to find the parent company liable for its subsidi-
ary's actions under an owner liability theory. It has been established that mere ownership of 
stock in a company is not sufficient to warrant liability. See supra note 72 and accompanying 
text. 
105 See Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 255. 
106 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
107 See Oswald & Schipani, supra note 74, at 298-99. 
108 See id. at 297. 
109 See id.; see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding 
stockholder liable under CERCLA); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D. N.H. 1988) 
(holding defendant liable under CERCLA sim:e he was sole shareholder of corporation and 
operator of the facility). . 
lIO See Mottola, 695 F. Supp. at 624. 
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he admitted to "incorporat[ing] Service [Pumping and Drain Co., Inc.] 
to escape potential personal liability by using the corporate entity as 
a shield."lll The court noted that Mottolo could have been found liable 
either by examining his operation of his company, Service Pumping 
and Drain Co., Inc. (Service), or through his admission to forming the 
company for an improper purpose.1l2 
The court stated that Mottolo, as the sole shareholder of Service, 
"is personally liable for tort liabilities incurred by the proprietorship" 
and "is also liable as a site operator in his capacity as owner of 
Service."1l3 The evidence in the case showed that Mottolo had "trans-
ported and arranged for the transportation of numerous containers 
and at least two tank trucks of hazardous waste materials . . . on 
behalf of Service, either driving the truck himself or having a Service 
employee drive."1l4 The court also held that this evidence clearly made 
Mottolo liable as a transporter of hazardous materials under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(3).1l5 
Mottolo's admission to creating Service merely to avoid personal 
liability would have itself been sufficient to hold him liable under 
CERCLA.u6 The court stated: "[a]lthough the corporate entity is 
generally recognized for most purposes, it may not be employed to 
avoid overriding federal legislative policies, and federal courts will 
disregard it if the interests of public convenience, fairness, and equity 
so demand."117 
In New York v. Shore Realty, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit concluded that the stockholder, Donald Leo-
Grande, was an "owner or operator" of the facility because his stock 
holdings could be seen as an indicia of ownership.us LeoGrande incor-
porated the Shore Realty Corporation for the purpose of purchasing 
the property on Shore Road, which contained hazardous materials.1l9 
LeoGrande was fully aware that the current tenants, Applied Envi-
ronmental Services, Inc. and Hazardous Waste Disposal, Inc. were 
operating an illegal hazardous waste storage facility on the prop-
III See id. 
112 See id. at 623-24. 
113 [d. at 623 (citing HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 41, § 18). 
114 [d. at 623 n.4. 
116 See Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 623 n.4. 
116 See id. at 624. 
117 [d. (citing Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986». 
118 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985). 
119 See id. at 1038. 
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erty.120 A number of tanks located above and below ground that con-
tained hazardous materials, clearly covered by CERCLA, were leak-
ing into the ground and contaminating both the groundwater and 
Hempstead Harbor.121 Shore employees brought the situation to the 
attention of the State, asking it "to enter the site, inspect it, and take 
steps to mitigate the 'life-threatening crisis situation."'l22 Thereafter, 
the state of New York sued Shore Realty Corp. to recover costs 
incurred in the inspection of the site and in supervising the disposal 
of the hazardous wastes.l23 
The Second Circuit found Shore liable for the costs incurred by the 
State, and held LeoGrande jointly and severally liable under CER-
CLA and New York state law.l24 Further, the court held that the 
security interest exemption did not apply to LeoGrande because he 
had participated actively in the management of the corporation, and 
thus was liable as an "operator" under CERCLA.126 The court im-
posed liability on LeoGrande without piercing the corporate veil by 
relying on a New York law allowing "a corporate officer who controls 
corporate conduct and [who] thus is an active individual participant 
in that conduct" to be held liable "for the torts of the corporation."126 
Thus, case law indicates that courts reject the use of an "owner" 
theory of liability and instead apply an "operator" theory when deter-
mining liability of corporate parents and shareholders. 
V. THE LIABILITY OF LENDERS 
A. The Growth of Lender Liability Under CERCLA 
Because CERCLA was primarily intended to target hazardous 
waste generators and transporters, the already-sparse legislative his-
tory fails miserably to provide direction on the issue of lender liabil-
ity.127 Because section 107 of CERCLA holds the current owner or 
operator of the waste site responsible, a problem arises when a lender 
forecloses on property which contains hazardous wastes. l28 However, 
120 ld. 
121ld. 
122ld. at n.3. 
123 Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1037. 
124 See id. at 1037. 
120 See id. at 1052. 
126 ld. at 1052. 
127 See Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 11, at 710; Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 
28. 
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I) (1994). 
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liability is unclear under the statute for a lender who forecloses on 
the property and becomes the "owner" by taking legal title.129 The 
definition of "operator" under CERCLA is also vague in describing 
what actions are considered to rise to the level of "participation in the 
management of."130 An exemption for secured creditors allows them 
to escape liability if they can prove that "without participating in the 
management of a vessel or facility, [they] hold an indicia of ownership 
primarily to protect [their] security interest in the vessel or facility."13l 
In United States v. Mirabile, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was the first to attempt to define 
what actions by a lender constitute participation in the management 
of a facility.l32 In Mirabile, EPA brought suit against the owners of 
the property to recover the costs of cleaning the waste created by the 
prior original owner, 'lUrco Coatings (ThrcO).l33 The plaintiffs then 
impleaded a number of third party defendants, including American 
Bank and Trust Company (American Bank), who had foreclosed on 
the property after 'lUrco had ceased operations on the site.134 Ameri-
can Bank held title to the property for four months before assigning 
title to the Mirabiles at a sheriff's sale.135 American Bank argued that 
this did not qualify it as an "owner" under CERCLA.136 The court 
agreed, holding that because American Bank acquired only equitable 
title pursuant to the foreclosure, and not legal title, and that American 
Bank merely foreclosed on the property and took "prudent and rou-
tine steps to secure the property against further depreciation," 
American Bank did not participate in the day-to-day management of 
the facility.137 Therefore, the court held, American Bank was not liable 
under CERCLA.138 
However, the court in Mirabile also stated that actions a lender 
normally would take to assist a troubled borrower may be construed 
as participating in the management of the borrower's business, thus 
subjecting the lender to CERCLA liability.139 These actions fell under 
129 See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 28. 
130 See id. 
131 [d. § 9601(20)(A). 
132 See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. 1985); see also 
Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 11, at 714--15. 
133 See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,994--95. 
134 See id. at 20,995. 
135 See id. at 20,996. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L Rep. at 20,996. 
139 See id. at 20995-96; see also Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 11, at 724. 
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the "operator" liability theory of CERCLA.140 Another third party 
defendant in Mirabile, Mellon Bank National Association (Mellon) 
became concerned about its financial interest in Turco, and as a result, 
became more vocal with the management as the company began to 
falter.141 The court denied Mellon's motion for summary judgment, 
holding that Mellon's actions might trigger CERCLA liability.l42 
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Tru,st, the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland distinguished Mirabile on 
the basis of the difference in the lenders' time of possession before 
resale.l43 In this case, Maryland Bank & Trust (Maryland Bank) at-
tempted to rely on the secured creditor exemption.l44 However, the 
court found this exemption inapplicable, holding that Maryland Bank 
was unlike American Bank in Mirabile because American Bank had 
assigned its interest in the property after the foreclosure. l45 Here, the 
court noted, Maryland Bank still owned the property (possessed legal 
title) at the time EPA filed suit against them.146 In finding CERCLA 
liability, the court noted that Maryland Bank purchased the property 
at the foreclosure sale to protect its investment, not its security 
interest, and that "only during the life of the mortgage did Maryland 
Bank hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security inter-
est in the land."147 Maryland Bank & Tru,st thus set precedent for the 
distinct possibility that lenders would not be able to foreclose and hold 
property without incurring CERCLA liablity under an "ownership" 
theory. 148 
In Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing, the resi-
dents of the Borough of Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania, brought suit 
against the defendant, alleging that BFG Electroplating and Manu-
facturing Co. (BFG) had contaminated the environment.149 BFG, in 
turn, filed third party complaints against the current and past owners 
of the adjacent property, known as the Berlin Property.150 BFG sought 
140 See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 30. 
141 See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997. 
142 See id. 
143 See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 n.5 (D. Md. 1986); 
Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 11, at 714-15. 
144 See Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579. 
146 See id. at 579 n.5. 
146 See id. at 576. 
147 See id. at 579. 
148 See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 31. 
149 See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556, 557 (W.D. Pa. 1989). 
150 See id. 
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indemnification against those owners and from the National Bank of 
the Commonwealth (National Bank), which had been a record title 
owner of the Berlin Property for eight months.151 When Berlin de-
faulted on its obligations to the bank, National Bank conducted sev-
eral meetings with the officials of Berlin Metal Polishers (Berlin) in 
an attempt to help the company avoid further defaults. l52 Just over 
one year later, National Bank foreclosed on the Berlin Property, and 
subsequently purchased it at the foreclosure sale. l53 The deed was 
delivered to the bank, and during its eight month period of ownership, 
National Bank paid the insurance premiums and property taxes on 
the Berlin property.l54 The Guidice court looked to the different time 
periods in which National Bank was involved with Berlin to determine 
whether CERCLA liability existed at any time under either an 
"owner" theory of liability or under an "operator" theory of liability.155 
The court held that prior to National Bank's purchase of the prop-
erty at the foreclosure sale, National Bank took steps only to protect 
its security interest when it conducted meetings with Berlin of-
ficials. l56 The court further concluded that under the existing case law, 
a mortgagee is exempt from CERCLA liability so long as there was 
no "participat[ion] in the managerial or operational aspects of the 
facility."157 The Guidice court followed the district court opinion in 
United States v. Fleet Factors,l58 which interpreted "participating in 
the management" and "primarily to protect its security interest" to 
permit a secured creditor "to provide financial assistance and general, 
and even isolated instances of specific management advice to its debt-
ors without risking CERCLA liability if the secured creditor does not 
participate in the day-to-day management of the business or facility 
either before or after the business ceases operation."159 The Guidice 
court held that National Bank's actions prior to the foreclosure were 
insufficient to render the secured creditor exemption void.160 
151 See id. 
152 See id. at 558. 
153 See id. at 559. 
154 See Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 559. 
155 See id. at 56!. 
156 See id. at 562. 
157Id. at 56!. 
158 See infra notes 163-72 and accompanying text. 
159 United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D. Ga. 1988), afl'd, 901 F.2d 
1550 (lIth Cir. 1990). 
160 See Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562. 
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However, the court in Guidice then looked to National Bank's ac-
tions after the purchase of the property at the foreclosure sale.161 
Relying primarily on Maryland Bank & Trust, the court held that the 
secured creditor exemption did not apply when National Bank be-
came the owner of the property, and thus National Bank was a PRP 
under CERCLA.162 In doing so, the court explicitly rejected the hold-
ing in Mirabile. l63 The court rationalized this by stating that "[w]hen 
a lender is the successful purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the lender 
should be liable to the same extent as any other bidder at the sale 
would have been."I64 
B. United States v. Fleet Factors 
In a decision that caused widespread panic among lenders, the 
United Stated Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explicitly 
rejected Mirabile in United States v. Fleet Factors.l65 Fleet Factors 
involved an attempt by EPA to expand the definition of "owner or 
operator" .166 The Eleventh Circuit held the lower court's construction 
of the secured creditor exemption "too permissive towards secured 
creditors who are involved with toxic waste facilities."167 The Elev-
enth Circuit further stated that to achieve the statutory goal of CER-
CLA, "ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to favor liabil-
ity for the costs incurred by the government in responding to the 
hazards at such facilities."168 Although the court affirmed the finding 
of a lack of CERCLA liability under § 9607(a)(1) for owning, operat-
ing, or controlling activities at the facility immediately before the tax 
foreclosure, the court looked to whether the lender was an operator 
of the facility at the time of disposal of the hazardous wastes.169 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the phrase "participating in the 
management" and the term "operator" were similar but not analo-
goUS.170 The court set a new standard, stating that a secured creditor 
may be liable under § 9607(a)(2) without being an operator, merely by 
161 See id. 
162 See id. at 563. 
163 See id. 
164 [d. 
165 See Guidice, F. Supp. at 561 (citing United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 
1558 (11th Cir. 1990»; see also Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 11, at 717. 
166 See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. 
167 [d. 
168 See id. 
169 See id. at 1554-55. 
170 See id. at 1557. 
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participating in the financial management of a facility "to a degree 
indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of haz-
ardous wastes."171 This analysis thus implicitly rejected Fleet's argu-
ment that it was merely protecting its security interest in the facility 
by foreclosing on its interests in the equipment, inventory, and fix-
tures.172 The court held that this argument was entirely immaterial to 
the test for whether the secured creditor exemption applied, as only 
"the nature and extent of the creditor's involvement with the facility, 
not its motive" is relevant.173 The rationale behind this holding was 
that Congress did not intend CERCLA to allow "secured creditors to 
take indifferent and irresponsible actions toward their debtors' haz-
ardous wastes with impunity by incanting that they were protecting 
their security interests."I74 
Because the Fleet Factors decision had the unforgiving ability to 
impose liability on lenders without their being an owner or operator, 
the nation's lenders and federal agencies became extremely concerned 
with the potential for disaster when lenders needed to take steps to 
protect their secured property during the term of the mortgage.175 
Before the Fleet Factors decision, lenders had the absolute ability to 
provide financial assistance or limited management advice without 
having to worry about CERCLA liability, so long as the lender did not 
cross the threshold into day-to-day management of the company.176 
Undoubtedly, lending practices became much more restricted and 
complicated after Fleet Factors.177 However, because Fleet Factors 
rests on the belief that financial institutions have had the power to 
protect themselves from CERCLA liability by making prudent loans, 
lending practices should not be adversely affected by the Fleet Fac-
tors decision.178 
In light of Fleet Factors, EPA promulgated a regulation in April, 
1992 to clarify the meaning of "participation in management."179 The 
rule allowed lenders to 1) investigate the site or facility before taking 
a security interest in the property; 2) continue to monitor the opera-
171 See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. 
172 See id. at 1560. 
173ld. 
1741d. 
176 See John W. Ames et aI., 10.qth Congress Builds New Safe Harbor, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., 8, 8 (1987); Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 38. 
176 See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 38. 
177 See id. 
178 See Joel R. Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Credi-
tors, and Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.T. 509, 539--41 (1986). 
179 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992). 
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tions of the facility; and 3) require further that the borrower comply 
with all environmentallaws.l80 Lenders are also permitted to conduct 
negotiations with management when loans are in danger of default.181 
Most importantly, the rule permitted lenders to foreclose on property 
without incurring any liability, so long as: 1) the lender did not par-
ticipate in the management of the facility prior to the foreclosure; and 
2) the lender made diligent attempts to resell or reassign the land 
after foreclosure. l82 
However, this affirmative step taken by EPA was abrogated by the 
decision in Kelley v. E PA.l83 In Kelly, the United States District Court 
for the District. of Columbia held that EPA exceeded its statutory 
authority under CERCLA to pass such a measure as a substantive 
rule, though the court admitted that EPA would not have exceeded 
its authority had the measure been drafted as an interpretive rule. l84 
Looking to the language of CERCLA, the court rejected EPA's argu-
ment that the power to pass such a regulation stemmed from sections 
105(a)(3) and 105(a)(4).185 EPA's premise was that these two sections 
granted them the authority to promulgate a national contigency plan 
in response to a contamination.186 The court conceded this position but 
emphasized that this power did not translate into the authority to 
determine liability under section 107.187 In vacating the rule, the court 
further held that the EPA rule does not have deference in court 
because Congress intended the courts, and not EPA, to determine 
issues of liability.188 
ISO See id. § 300.1100(c)(2). 
181 See id. § 300.1100(c)(2)(ii)(B). 
182 See id. § 300.1100(d). 
183 See Kelley v. Environmental Protection Agency, 15 F.3d 1100, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
184 See id. at 1108. 
185 See id. at 1106. 
186 See id. at 1105. These sections apply to EPA through the agency authority granted to the 
President in section 115 to delegate and assign any duties, including the power to promulgate 
regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605(a)(3)-(4), 
9615 (1994). However, this agency authority was limited by Wagner Seed v. Bush to allow the 
EPA only to interpret certain language in section 106 that applied to EPA's administrative 
responsibilities only. See Wagner Seed Co., Inc. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
187 See Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1105 n.3. 
188 See id. at 1108-09. 
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C. The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit 
Insurance Protection Act of 1996 
709 
The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance 
Protection Act of 1996 (ALDA) was enacted on September 30, 1996. 
ALDA amends CERCLA by adding new subsections E, F, and G to 
the definitions provided in section 101(20).189 ALDA also explicitly 
reinstates the EPA rule vacated by Kelley v. EPA stating that it was 
"validly issued under authority of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980."190 
The term "participate in management" is amended to "mean[] ac-
tually participating in the management or operational affairs of a 
vessel or facility; and ... does not include merely having the capacity 
to influence, or the unexercised right to control, vessel or facility 
operations."191 Furthermore, the law explicitly excludes from the 
CERCLA definition of "owner or operator" a lender who forecloses 
on the property, subject to any participation in the management of 
that facility.192 Thus, a lender may foreclose on property without 
threat of incurring liability so long as it did not participate in the 
management of the vessel or facility before the foreclosure, and ac-
tively seeks to sell, release, or liquidate the facility after the foreclo-
sure.193 ALDA also permits a lender to meet with management to 
renegotiate the terms of the loan or to provide financial advice if the 
company is in danger of defaulting. l94 
Prior to the passage of ALDA, courts had been slowly expanding 
the extent of lender liability.195 Lenders were soon finding themselves 
incurring liability for actions they believed were taken to protect their 
investments and not for the sake of participating in the management 
of the facility.l96 The Fleet Factors decision was the climax in this 
expansion, sending lenders scrambling to rethink their lending prac-
tices, and to ensure that they were not already subject to liability.197 
189 See ALDA § 2502(b). 
190 See id. § 2504(a). 
191 [d. § 2502(b). 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
194 See ALDA § 2502(b). 
195 See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 38. 
196 See id. 
197 See Ames, supra note 175, at 8. 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
A. Inconsistencies of Pre-ALDA Lender Liability Case Law with 
Traditional Notions of Corporate Law 
1. Lenders as stakeholders 
Much like shareholders, lenders contribute capital to corporations 
who wish to expand into a larger, more profitable firm by providing 
them with the means to pursue various ventures that may not be 
otherwise feasible. 198 Similarly, shareholders are, in most cases, a chief 
source of capital for both initial startup companies and longstanding 
giants.199 Although these two groups differ in that one is a debt holder 
and the other an equity holder, both interests are still considered to 
be forms of ownership interests in a corporation.20o A lender's interest 
is specifically tied to a particular piece of corporate property, while a 
shareholder has a general interest in the affairs of the corporation.201 
Nonetheless, lenders and shareholders both hold a stake in the mat-
ters of the corporation.202 
2. The Inconsistency between Lender Liability Cases and 
Shareholder Liability Cases under CERCLA 
The cases under CERCLA before the passage of ALDA failed to 
realize the similarities between lenders and shareholders.203 In terms 
of imposing CERCLA liability on lenders and shareholders when 
their participation in the management of the facility is evident, the 
case law is consistent when applying an "operator" theory of liabil-
ity.204 The statutory language of CERCLA is clear that the operators 
of a hazardous waste facility are to be held liable.205 
In cases involving lenders, courts have imposed liability on those 
who have involved themselves in the day-to-day management of the 
company or facility.206 Further, the courts have been consistent in 
198 See 19 FLETCHER CYC CORP §§ 3:40, 3:41. 
199 See id. § 3:43. 
200 See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 318 (7th Cir. 1996). 
201 See 19 FLETCHER CYC CORP §§ 3:41, 3:42. 
202 See id.; In re Hoskins, 102 F.2d at 318. 
203 See supra Parts IV and V. 
204 See supra Parts IV and V. 
205 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1)--(2) (1994). 
206 See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557--QO (lIth Cir. 1990) (creating 
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finding that the "secured creditor" exemption does not apply when 
lenders participate in the management of a facility.207 Such a degree 
of involvement clearly extends beyond merely "hold[ing] indicia of 
ownership primarily to protect [their] security interest in the vessel 
or facility."208 
Similarly, in the cases dealing with shareholders and corporate par-
ents, courts have consistently imposed liability on these two groups 
when the facts clearly indicated that they were active in the day-to-
day operations of the facility.209 It is clear under the case law that 
when the courts attempted to pierce the corporate veil, shareholders 
were almost never held liable.210 Shareholder liability only resulted 
when the shareholder was also a corporate officer, or a shareholder in 
a closely held company, or more simply stated, when the shareholder 
was in a position to "participate in the management" of the company.211 
Furthermore, closer examination of the cases clearly indicates that it 
was not necessary to hold these shareholders individually liable in 
their capacities as owners, in order to find liability.212 Instead, the 
courts needed only to look to the extent of the individuals' participa-
harsher standard holding that "participating in the management" and "operator liability" were 
similar but not analogous and thus a secured creditor can be held liable under § 9607(a)(2) 
without even being an operator); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994, 20,997 
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (denying motion for summary judgment brought by third party plaintiff, Mellon 
Bank, stating that its actions in helping faltering company may have triggered CERCLA 
liability). 
207 See Fleet Factars, 901 F.2d at 1559; United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, Co., 632 F. 
Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986); Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995. 
208 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994); see also Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555-56; Maryland 
Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579; Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995. 
209 Liability has been found with and without piercing the corporate veil. See Schiavone, 79 
F.3d at 254-55 (stating that operator liability is really independent of the actions of the subsidi-
ary, and thus the controlling parent must be held liable directly, without piercing the corporate 
veil); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that 
although facility was run by subsidiary, parent corporation was liable as an operator of facility, 
without piercing the corporate veil, for parent's control over subsidiary); New York V. Shore 
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding stockholder/officer personally liable 
under "operator" theory of liability because he managed the corporation, and was thus covered 
by CERCLA under § 9601(20)(A»; United States V. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. 
Pa. 1989) (adopting an "operator" theory of liability used by court in In re Acushnet River, 
stating that the corporate veil should be pierced to hold the parent company liable only if the 
parent controls or controlled the subsidiary at the "relevant time"); United States V. Mottolo, 
695 F. Supp. 615, 623 (D.N.H. 1988) (holding sole shareholder of corporation personally liable 
"as a site operator in his capacity as owner"). 
210 See supra Part IV.D. 
211 See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052; Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 623. 
212 Seeid. 
712 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:687 
tion in the day-to-day management of the company, and impose liabil-
ity based on an "operator" theory.213 Thus, courts have shied away 
from piercing the corporate veil and imposing "owner" liability on 
shareholders.214 
With respect to the cases dealing with lender liability prior to the 
passage of ALDA, however, courts had increasingly found "owner" 
liability.215 Beginning with Mirabile, and culminating in Fleet Factors, 
lenders were subjected to growing limitations on their ability to en-
sure the security of their lien via the expanding threat of CERCLA 
liability.216 This trend, however, is inconsistent when considering lend-
ers as stakeholders in a corporation. 
When a lender has clearly not "participated in the management" of 
the facility, then rationally, the majority of circuits should only look 
to "owner" liability and not "operator" liability.217 This theory survives 
even the Fleet Factors standard, which separates "participation in the 
management" as its own theory of liability from the statutory theories 
of owner, operator, arranger, and transporter liability.218 Furthermore, 
an investigation into "owner" liability for lenders is similar to conduct-
ing the test for piercing the corporate veil with respect to sharehold-
ers and parent companies. Lenders, shareholders, and parent compa-
nies all hold some form of an ownership interest in the company 
operating the site.219 Thus, imposing liability on lenders under an 
"owner" theory is necessarily similar to piercing the corporate veil 
based on mere ownership of an interest in the corporation. However, 
courts will only pierce the corporate veil to hold shareholders and 
parent companies liable if the facts demonstrate that the corporation 
213 See id. 
214 See supra Part IV.D. 
215 See supra Part V.A. 
216 See supra Part V.A. 
217 With the exception ofthe Eleventh Circuit (the Fleet Factors court), the other circuits that 
have dealt with this issue have held that "operator" liability excludes those situations where 
the lender has not "participated in the management" of the company. This, of course, also 
assumes that the lender was not directly operating any part of the facility in any way. See supra 
Part V.A. 
218 Arguably, if the possibility of holding the lender liable under arranger or transporter 
theories of liability exists, its activities as such may be sufficient to cause the lender to be found 
also as an operator, and thus held liable as one. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1994); United 
States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (1Ith Cir. 1990) (stating "individuals and 
entities involved in the operations of a facility are already liable as operators under the express 
language of section 9607(a)(2)"). 
219 See Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Acushnet 
River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987). 
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was formed to perpetrate a fraud or avoid personalliability.220 Courts 
have further held that the mere ownership of stock does not fall under 
the definition of "ownership" when determining "owner" liability.221 
With respect to lenders, however, the Fleet Factors decision made it 
clear that lenders may be held liable as an owner of the waste site 
upon foreClosure, despite the lender's lack of participation in the man-
agement of that site.222 Although it failed to elaborate any further, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
in Mirabile recognized an inconsistency, stating "that 'site control 
is an important consideration in determining who qualifies as an 
"owner" under Section 107(a)' ... simply does not apply with the same 
force to secured creditors as it does to corporate officers and/or share-
holders."223 
Herein lies the problem. If a lender possesses a debt interest in a 
piece of property, but is not permitted to intervene in the activities 
of the operating corporation to ensure that hazardous wastes are not 
being stored or transported to or from the site,224 yet, at the same time 
will inevitably incur CERCLA liability under an "owner" theory if 
forced to foreclose on the property,225 what incentives remain for a 
lender to continue to make loans to small or large businesses? We may 
impose a burden on lenders to make prudent loans; however, even due 
diligence by a lender does not guarantee the compliance of the bor-
rower after the signing of the loan papers. By imposing "owner" 
liability on lenders in such a situation, courts have effectively pierced 
the corporate veil to hold the lender liable. The case law is unclear as 
to why the corporate veil was not pierced to hold the officers and/or 
directors of the company operating the site individually liable for 
managing the business in such a way.226 Again, to pierce the corporate 
220 See supra Part IV.B. The Joslyn court even so far as to say that parent companies are not 
included in the definition of owners or operators under CERCLA, and that the legislative 
history would have done so had Congress intended to extend liability to the parents. See Joslyn, 
893 F.2d at 82---83. 
221 See id. at 82---83; In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 32. 
222 See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1560. 
223 United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
224 Such actions would fall under "participation in the management" and void the secured 
creditor exemption. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20) (A) (1994); Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1559; United 
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986); Mirabile, 15 Envtl. 
L. Rep. at 20,995. 
225 See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. 
226 See generally Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1150; Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 
F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573; Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. 
Rep. 20,994. 
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veil, courts must look to see if: 1) the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the shareholders/owners are unified; and 2) to respect 
the corporate form would sanction a fraud or promote an injustice.227 
A number of considerations factor into satisfying the first element 
of unity of interest, one of which is an inquiry into the amount of 
control exercised by the shareholders.228 If that control is extensive 
or pervasive, the first element of veil piercing is satisfied.229 Arguably, 
the second element of the two prong test used to determine if veil 
piercing is justified can be met relatively easily. In application, this 
has been a subjective test to determine whether an injustice will 
result if the corporate veil is not pierced.230 Thus, a piercing seems 
justified when failure to do so would result in holding an innocent or 
powerless party responsible, in this case, the lender. 
In the alternative, because case law indicates a strong aversion of 
courts to pierce the corporate veil, why not hold the owners and 
operators responsible for the presence of hazardous wastes at the 
site liable under an "operator" theory of liability? CERCLA clearly 
defines operator liability as including those operators "who at the time 
of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility 
at which such hazardous substances were disposed of."231 The lan-
guage "at the time of disposal" already provides a retroactive ability 
for courts to hold the prior owners individually liable, even after the 
foreclosure by the lender.232 More importantly, the problem of holding 
unresponsible parties liable does not arise. 
B. How ALDA Solves the Problem 
ALDA resolves this inconsistency by reinstating the 1992 EPA 
Final Rule on Lender Liability that had been vacated by Kelley.233 
ALDA clearly limits the term "participate in the management" to 
only those actions taken by the lender that are "actually participating 
in the management ... and does not include merely having the capac-
ity to influence, or the unexercised right to control."234 This phrase 
227 See Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chern. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 1985). 
228 See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987). 
229 See United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1985); In re 
Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 33. 
230 See Van Dom, 753 F.2d at 570; Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 209, 522-24 
(4th Cir. 1991). 
231 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994). 
232 See id. 
233 See ALDA § 2504(a). 
234 See id. § 2502(b). 
1998] LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 715 
had been the main source of trouble for courts in deciding lender 
liability.235 
Furthermore, ALDA excludes lenders who have foreclosed on 
property from the CERCLA definition of "owner," thus correctly 
subjecting lenders to liability only when their participation in the 
management of the facility is truly an active role in the day-to-day 
decision-making.236 Finally, ALDA allows for lenders to investigate 
the site and the company during the course of the loan term, and even 
to build covenants into the loan agreement relating to environmental 
compliance by the borrower.237 These provisions enable a lender to 
take affirmative steps to protect its security interest in the property, 
without the fear of incurring liability.23B Because the boundaries of 
lender action have now been clearly stated in ALDA, the liability of 
lenders under CERCLA will follow a more consistent and predictable 
course. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Arguably, the future of the lending business had been in serious 
jeopardy because of the ever-increasing threat of CERCLA liability 
for cleanup costs. The passage of ALDA solves the courts' confusion 
about lender liability under CERCLA, providing clarity and direction 
for future cases. It sets clear terms for lenders to abide by in their 
effort to protect the value of their security interest. Furthermore, 
ALDA resolves the inconsistency in holding lenders liable under an 
"owner" theory of CERCLA liability which did not exist for share-
holders and parent companies. This problem had also arisen, though 
unnoticed, as a result of the confusion surrounding lender liability. 
Thankfully, Congress's moves toward filling some of the gaps result-
ing from the haste in putting CERCLA into action in 1980. 
235 See Nicholson & Zuiderhoek, supra note 9, at 28. 
236 See ALDA § 2502(b). 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
